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Effects of EEOC Recognition of Title VII as Prohibiting 
Discrimination Based on Transgender Identity 
LAUREN SANDERS* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last few years in the United States, the transgender community has 
become more visible in the public arena. In 2015 alone, seven transgender 
characters premiered on television shows,1 a transgender man was named a 
semi-finalist in the Ultimate Men’s Health Guy Competition,2 and President 
Obama hired the first transgender White House official.3 In the continuously 
evolving public discussion of transgender people, attention is frequently focused 
on the lives of transgender celebrities, such as the Orange is the New Black actress, 
Laverne Cox,4 and former Olympic athlete and reality television star, Caitlyn 
Jenner.5 The star-studded, glamorous experiences of these celebrities, however, 
do not accurately reflect the socioeconomic realities of most transgender 
individuals. In 2011, the National Center for Transgender Equality and the 
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force surveyed 6,456 people who identified as 
transgender and gender non-conforming.6 The study revealed that transgender 
individuals are likely to live in extreme poverty.7 Study participants were nearly 
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 1.  See Where We Are On TV Report - 2015, GLADD, http://www.glaad.org/whereweareontv15 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2015) (counting the number of transgender television characters in primetime, 
cable, and streaming series for the 2015-2016 season). Three transgender characters were featured in 
cable series, and four transgender were featured in streaming series. Id. 
 2.  Transgender Man Leads ‘Men’s Health’ Cover Model Contest, NPR (Apr. 19, 2015, 6:49 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/04/19/400826487/transgender-man-leads-mens-health-cover-model-
contest. 
 3.  See Carol E. Lee, First Transgender White House Official, Raffi Freedman-Gurspan, Gets to Work, 
WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Aug. 18, 2015, 11:13 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/08/18/first-transgender-white-house-official-raffi-freedman-
gurspan-gets-to-work/ (reporting that President Obama hired Ms. Freedman-Gurspan, a transgender 
woman, as the director of outreach and recruitment for the White House personnel office). 
 4.  Eric Spitznagel, Laverne Cox: ‘Blending In Was Never an Option,’ N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 29, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/magazine/laverne-cox-blending-in-was-never-an-
option.html?_r=0 (presenting an interview with Laverne Cox regarding her life as a transgender 
woman and her role on Orange is the New Black, a Netflix original series). 
 5.  See, e.g., I am Cait (E! television broadcast July 26, 2015) (presenting an intimate look into 
Caitlyn Jenner’s life as a transgender woman).  
 6.  JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE & NAT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER 
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 12 (2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/ 
reports/ntds_full.pdf. 
 7.  See id. at 2 (reporting the responses of study participants from across the United States  and 
U.S. territories). 
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four times more likely to have a household income of less than $10,000 per year 
than the general population.8 They also experienced unemployment at twice the 
rate of the general population.9 The study further revealed that in the workplace, 
discrimination based on transgender and non-conforming gender identities was 
a “near universal experience” for the study’s participants.10 Further, forty-seven 
percent of the survey respondents reported that they had experienced an adverse 
employment action—defined as losing a job, being discriminated against in 
hiring, and/or being denied a promotion—because of their transgender or non-
conforming gender identities.11 
Discrimination against transgender employees may implicate Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Title VII prohibits employers in the 
United States from “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” based on the 
employee’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”12 If current trends in 
employment discrimination law continue, Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination also will prohibit employers from discriminating based on an 
employee’s transgender identity. 
The United States Article III courts have not yet interpreted Title VII to 
prohibit discrimination based on transgender identity alone. But the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with 
implementing the statute, has interpreted Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination as prohibiting discrimination based on a person’s transgender 
identity.13 The agency has taken action to ensure employers’ compliance with 
this interpretation of Title VII.14 Although lacking the force of law15 and Chevron 
deference in court,16 the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII likely has helped to 
develop a new, and thriving, area of employment discrimination law. 
Additionally, the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII may create an impetus for 
recognition of transgender employment rights by the federal courts. 
I. TRANSGENDER PEOPLE: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
In October 2009, President Obama became the first United States president 
to mention the word “transgender” in a public statement.17 In January of 2015, 
 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 3. 
 10.  Id. at 56.  
 11.  Id. at 53. 
 12.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).  
 13.  Macy v. Holder, 2012 EEOPUB LEXIS 1181, at *19 (U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n 
Apr. 20, 2012). 
 14.  See, e.g., Plaintiff EEOC’s Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, EEOC v. Lakeland Eye Clinic, 
P.A., No. 8:14-cv-2421 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2014) (arguing a transgender woman was fired because of 
her sex). 
 15.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2012) (explaining that the EEOC has the power to enforce 
“suitable procedural regulations” to carry out Title VII). 
 16.  Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 n.6 (2002). 
 17.  See President Barack Obama, Remarks at Human Rights Campaign Dinner (Oct. 11, 2009), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-human-rights-campaign-dinner 
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President Obama made transgender history once again, becoming the first 
president to reference transgender people in the State of the Union Address.18 
Although the Office of the President has officially recognized transgender people 
only in recent years, transgender people are not a new phenomena: transgender 
people have been documented in Eastern, Western, and indigenous cultures 
since antiquity.19 For example, India’s hijras, transgender male-to-female 
individuals,20 are mentioned in Hindu mythology.21 Medieval court records from 
England show that in 1394, John Rykener, “who call[ed] himself Eleanor,” was 
arrested while dressed in women’s clothing and prosecuted for having sex with a 
man in the London streets one night.22 And in 1887, Dr. William Hammond 
wrote about mujerados, effeminate men who performed tasks traditionally done 
by women in Pueblo communities in the American Southwest.23 
The language with which transgender and gender-nonconforming people 
are described vary across cultures and change with time.24 Today, “transgender” 
is used as an umbrella term that encompasses “persons whose gender identity, 
gender expression, or gender behavior does not conform to the sex to which they 
were assigned at birth.”25 “Transgender” may refer to people whose gender 
identity does not match their natal sex, people who cross-dress or perform as 
drag queens, and people who identify as gender-queer or gender-
nonconforming.26 
There are other terms that are pervasive in the study and discussion of the 
transgender population and employment discrimination. The term “gender 
identity” means a “person’s internal sense of being male or female or something 
else.”27 Gender identity should not be confused with “sexual orientation,” which 
refers to a person’s sexual attraction to one or more sexes.28 Transgender people 
may be heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, or asexual, just like people who do 
 
(thanking the Human Rights Campaign for their work “on behalf of the millions of people in this 
country who work hard in their jobs and care deeply about their families— and who are gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, or transgender”). 
 18.  See Katy Steinmetz, Why It’s a Big Deal that Obama Said ‘Transgender’, TIME (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://time.com/3676881/state-of-the-union-2015-barack-obama-transgender/ (explaining the 
historical significance of President Obama’s acknowledgment of transgender people in the State of 
the Union Address).  
 19.  See Answers to Your Questions About Transgender People, Gender Identity and Gender Expression, 
AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.aspx (last visited Oct. 16, 2015) 
[hereinafter Answers].  
 20.  See JASON CROMWELL, TRANSMEN AND FTMS: IDENTITIES, BODIES, GENDERS, AND SEXUALITIES 
57 (1999).  
 21.  SERENA NANDA, NEITHER MAN NOR WOMAN: THE HIJRAS OF INDIA 13 (1990).  
 22.  David Boyd & Ruth Karras, The Interrogation of a Male Transvestite Prostitute in Fourteenth-
Century London, 1 GLQ 462–63 (1995). Rykener confessed that he engaged in prostitution with men 
and women and that a former servant had taught him to cross-dress. Id. at 463. Rykener also had 
worked as an embroideress in Oxford. Id. 
 23.  WILLIAM A. HAMMOND, SEXUAL IMPOTENCE IN THE MALE AND FEMALE 163–64 (1887). 
 24.  Answers, supra note 19. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
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not identify as transgender.29 The term “gender expression” means the “way a 
person communicates his or her gender identity to others.”30 One term that is 
particularly common in health studies but is also used in employment law is 
“transgender women,” or “male to female,” which often is used to mean 
individuals who were born biologically male but identify as women at least part 
of the time.31 Finally, “transgender men,” or “female to male,” often means 
people who were born biologically female but identify as men at least part of the 
time.32 
How members of the transgender community react to and experience their 
gender identities may differ. Identifying as transgender is not considered a 
mental disorder because disorders involve significant stress and disability, and 
many transgender people do not find that their gender causes them significant 
stress or disability.33 Individuals who experience intense, persistent gender 
incongruence that is stressful or disabling, however, may be diagnosed with 
gender dysphoria.34 Some transgender people may choose to transition to their 
preferred gender.35 That is, they may change their clothing and grooming, or 
adopt a new a new name consistent with their gender identity.36 They may also 
choose to undergo gender-confirming medical procedures, such as sex-
reassignment surgery and hormone therapy.37 Some transgender people who 
wish to undergo gender-confirming medical procedures, however, may find the 
cost of the services to be prohibitive.38 
II. TITLE VII BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Title VII was enacted during the Civil Rights Movement as part of a 1964 
omnibus bill that addressed discrimination not only in employment, but also in 
voting, public accommodations, and education.39 In the years leading up to the 
enactment of Title VII, the United States witnessed the depths of racial 
 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Jae Sevelius, Transgender Issues in HIV: Providers Need Accurate, Current Information to Provide 
Optimal Care, HIV SPECIALIST, Dec. 2013, at 30, 31, http://www.aahivm.org/Upload_Module/ 
upload/Magazine/FINAL%20PDF2%20dec2013%20mag.pdf.  
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Answers, supra note 19. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See Lisa V. Gillespie, Gender Reassignment: Large Companies Push Progressive Benefits Forward, 
EMP. BENEFIT NEWS, Feb. 1, 2012, at 16 (estimating the average cost of a male-to-female reassignment 
surgery at about $17,000). Beyond surgery, hormones cost on average $1,500, therapy costs on 
average $1,000, and doctors’ visits and labs cost on average $500. Id. Many employers do not provide 
their employees with health insurance that covers the cost of gender reassignment surgery. Id.; see also 
Lenny Bernstein, Here’s How Sex Reassignment Works, WASH. POST: TO YOUR HEALTH (Feb. 9, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2015/02/09/heres-how-sex-
reassignment-surgery-works/ (reporting that male-to-female sex reassignment surgery costs between 
$40,000 to $60,000 in total and that female-to-male sex reassignment surgery costs over $75,000). 
 39.  EEOC, THE STORY OF THE UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: 
ENSURING THE PROMISE OF OPPORTUNITY FOR 35 YEARS 1 (2000) [hereinafter THE STORY OF THE EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION]. 
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discrimination in the country, and there was a sense of urgency that change 
needed to happen.40 On June 11, 1963, President John F. Kennedy addressed 
Congress on civil rights issues, including those in the workplace.41 In his address, 
President Kennedy explained, “[D]ifficulties over segregation and 
discrimination” had produced “a rising tide of discontent that threaten[ed] the 
public safety” and that “the events in Birmingham and elsewhere” called for a 
federal solution for the problem of segregation and discrimination.42 President 
Kennedy emphasized that Congress’s solution to segregation and discrimination 
needed to include eliminating racial discrimination in employment.43 
Title VII was Congress’s solution to eliminating discrimination in the 
employment context. The remedial statute prohibits employers from 
discriminating against their employees on the basis of five characteristics: race, 
color, religion, national origin, or sex.44 The law also prohibits an employer from 
retaliating against an employee because the employee complains about 
discrimination or files a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, an independent 
administrative agency.45 Title VII further requires that employers “reasonably 
accommodate” job applicants’ and employees’ sincerely held religious beliefs, 
unless doing so would place an “undue hardship” on the employer’s business 
practices.46 
The EEOC is the agency charged with enforcing Title VII.47 Any employee 
alleging Title VII violations must first file a charge with the EEOC before filing a 
complaint in a federal court,48 usually within 180 days of the discriminatory act.49 
The charge process is simple; it involves completing a form that gives the basic 
facts of the employee’s complaint and the legal claims the employee intends to 
make.50 The charge is then investigated by the EEOC.51 Through its investigation, 
the agency determines if there is reasonable cause to believe that the employer 
discriminated against the employee.52 If the EEOC finds that there is not 
reasonable cause to believe that the alleged discrimination occurred, the EEOC 
dismisses the complaint and sends the employee a “Dismissal and Notice of 
Rights” letter.53 If the EEOC finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that 
the alleged discrimination occurred, the agency issues a Letter of Determination, 
and both parties will be invited to participate in conciliation.54 Once the EEOC 
 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  President John F. Kennedy, Report to the American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963), 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/LH8F_0Mzv0e6Ro1yEm74Ng.aspx.  
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id.  
 44.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 45.  § 2000e-3(a).  
 46.  § 2000e(j). 
 47.  See § 2000e-5(a) (giving the EEOC the power to enforce Title VII).  
 48.  § 2000e-5(b). 
 49.  § 2000e-5(e). 
 50.  § 2000e-5(b). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id.  
Sanders Macro (Do Not Delete) 4/15/2016  2:03 PM 
268 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 23:263 2016 
issues either the Dismissal and Notice of Rights or a Letter of Determination, the 
employee is able to file a lawsuit in a federal court.55 The EEOC also may bring 
lawsuits on behalf of plaintiffs.56 
Additionally, the EEOC promulgates regulations that help clarify Title VII, 
such as those defining discrimination based on “sex.”57 The EEOC’s 
interpretations of Title VII, however, do not have the force of law.58 Moreover, 
unlike with other federal agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, 
EEOC interpretations of the law do not receive Chevron deference in court.59 
Rather, EEOC interpretations of Title VII are “entitled to respect,”60 but “only to 
the extent that they have the power to persuade.”61 
III. THE FEDERAL COURTS, TITLE VII, AND DISCRIMINATION BASED ON 
TRANSGENDER IDENTITY 
In several cases before the United States Article III courts, transgender 
plaintiffs have argued that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination based on sex 
also encompasses discrimination against transgender people.62 The federal 
courts, however, have not yet interpreted Title VII so expansively. The courts 
have consistently declined to hold that the statute prohibits discrimination 
against a transgender person based on the person’s self-identification as 
transgender or gender non-conforming.63 For example, in Etsitty v. Utah Transit 
Authority, a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 
the plaintiff worked as a bus operator with the Utah Transit Authority (UTA).64 
The plaintiff identified as a transgender woman;65 she was born biologically male 
but identified as a woman and had always believed that she had been born with 
the wrong anatomical sex organs.66 She also had been diagnosed with gender 
dysphoria,67 the mental health diagnosis for transgender people who experience 
intense, persistent gender incongruence that is stressful or disabling.68 
 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  § 2000e-5(f).  
 57.  § 2000e-12(a).  
 58.  See id. (explaining that the EEOC has the power to enforce “suitable procedural regulations” 
to carry out Title VII).  
 59.  Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 n.6 (2002).  
 60.  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1994),  
 61.  Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). The courts determine the weight of an 
EEOC interpretation “based on thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 62.  See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007); Smith v. City of 
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 571 (6th Cir. 2004); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1082 (7th Cir. 1984); 
Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 
566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 63.  See, e.g., Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221; City of Salem, 378 F.3d at 574; Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084; 
Sommers, 667 F.2d at 749–50; Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662–63.  
 64.  Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 1218. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Answers, supra note 19. 
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The plaintiff maintained a masculine appearance when UTA initially hired 
her, though she had been taking female hormones for the previous four years.69 
Soon after she began her employment with UTA, the plaintiff further changed 
her appearance at work to match her female gender identity, which her 
immediate supervisor supported.70 She wore makeup, jewelry, and acrylic nails 
to work, and she used public women’s restrooms on her bus route.71 She had not 
yet undergone gender reassignment surgery because she could not afford to pay 
for the surgical operation.72 
The Operations Manager for the UTA division in which the plaintiff worked 
eventually heard about a “male operator who was wearing makeup.”73 The 
Operations Manager met with the plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, who told her 
about the plaintiff’s transgender identity.74 The Operations Manager became 
concerned about liability associated with a UTA employee with male genitalia 
being seen using the public women’s restroom.75 Because of her concerns, the 
Operations Manager placed the plaintiff on administrative leave.76 She ultimately 
terminated her.77 The plaintiff sued UTA, arguing that UTA had discriminated 
against her in violation of Title VII because discrimination based on transgender 
identity is in fact discrimination based on sex.78 
The Tenth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that UTA had violated 
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.79 The appellate court determined 
that “the plain meaning of ‘sex’” does not “encompass[] anything more than 
male and female.”80 The court reasoned that because the meaning of “sex” 
traditionally refers only to the biological concepts of “male” and “female,” 
transgender plaintiffs may not claim that Title VII protects against discrimination 
based on transgender identity.81 Title VII thus protects transgender employees 
from discrimination only if they are discriminated against because they are 
biologically male or female.82 
 
 69.  Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1218–19. 
 70.  Id. at 1219. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 1221. In June 2015, the U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”) released guidelines for transgender employees’ restroom use. OSHA, A 
GUIDE TO RESTROOM ACCESS FOR TRANSGENDER WORKERS (June 1, 2015), https://www.osha.gov/ 
Publications/OSHA3795.pdf. OSHA recommends that employers allow their employees to use the 
facilities that correspond with their gender identities, not their natal sex. Id. at 2. Employers also 
should consider providing single-occupancy, gender-neutral facilities, or gender-neutral, single-stall 
facilities with lockable stalls. Id. 
 76.  Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id. at 1221.  
 79.  Id. at 1222. 
 80.  Id..  
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See id.; see also Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that 
“Congress never considered nor intended that this 1964 legislation apply to anything other than the 
traditional concept of sex. Had Congress intended more, surely the legislative history would have at 
least mentioned its intended broad coverage of homosexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals”). 
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Although such cases hold that transgender individuals may not claim that 
Title VII protects against discrimination based only on transgender identity, the 
federal courts have not left transgender plaintiffs without recourse in Title VII. 
The courts have allowed transgender plaintiffs to prevail in claims brought 
under a sex-stereotyping theory.83 A sex-stereotyping claim involves an 
employer allegedly discriminating against an employee because the employee 
fails to comply with stereotypical gender norms in the workplace.84 The Supreme 
Court first articulated this theory of discrimination in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins.85 In this case, the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins (“Hopkins”), had been working 
for Price Waterhouse’s Office of Government Services for five years when her 
name was proposed for partnership.86 During her employment with Price 
Waterhouse, Hopkins demonstrated strong work performance; shortly before her 
bid for partnership, she played a pivotal role in procuring Price Waterhouse a 
$25 million contract with the U.S. Department of State.87 The partners, however, 
denied Hopkins the partnership at least partially because she did not conduct 
herself in a stereotypically feminine manner.88 Several criticized Hopkins’ use of 
profanity.89 Another partner said that she could use a “course at charm school.”90 
The partner who was responsible for telling Hopkins that she had not been 
elevated to partnership advised her to “walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and 
wear jewelry” if she wished to make partner in the future.91 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court explained that sex-stereotyping violates Title VII’s prohibition on 
discrimination based on sex: “[A]n employer who acts on the basis of a belief that 
a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of 
gender.”92 When an employee’s position requires that she be aggressive but 
when the employer also objects to women being aggressive, she is caught in a 
catch-22.93 “Title VII lifts women out of this bind.”94 
The courts have expanded Price Waterhouse sex-stereotyping theory of 
discrimination to protect all plaintiffs from sex discrimination.95 Successful sex-
 
 83.  See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
transgender plaintiff stated a Title VII claim for sex discrimination “by alleging discrimination . . . for 
his failure to conform to sex stereotypes”); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 
(1st Cir. 2000) (holding that a transgender plaintiff stated a valid Title VII claim by alleging that he 
“did not receive [a] loan application because he was a man, whereas a similarly situated woman 
would have received [a] loan application. That is, the Bank . . . treat[s] . . . a woman who dresses like a 
man differently than a man who dresses like a woman”). 
 84.  See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining sex-stereotyping 
theory of sex discrimination under Title VII).  
 85.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).  
 86.  Id. at 233. 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id. at 234.  
 89.  Id. at 235. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Id. at 250.  
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[a]ll persons, 
whether transgender or not, are protected from discrimination on the basis of gender stereotype”). 
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stereotyping claims have been brought against employers who discriminated 
against their male employees for wearing jewelry considered too effeminate96 
and against their female employees for not wearing makeup and dresses to 
work.97 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has even held 
that Title VII protects male employees against discrimination for carrying a 
serving tray too gracefully.98 The statute’s protections against sex stereotyping 
extend to everyone, which logically must include transgender people.99 
IV. THE EEOC, TITLE VII, AND DISCRIMINATION BASED ON TRANSGENDER IDENTITY 
A. The EEOC Interprets Title VII as Prohibiting Discrimination Based on 
Transgender Identity. 
The EEOC has taken a different approach than the federal courts regarding 
the interpretation of the sex-based protections provided by Title VII. The 
administrative agency interprets Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination based 
on “sex” as encompassing discrimination based on transgender identity.100 That 
is, transgender plaintiffs may bring claims of discrimination without relying on 
the sex-stereotyping theory under the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII.101 The 
administrative agency’s stance on Title VII and transgender plaintiffs originated 
with its adopting a Strategic Enforcement Plan in September 2012 for Fiscal Years 
2013-2016.102 The plan identified national priorities for the EEOC to ensure that 
agency resources would be used effectively to prevent and remedy 
discrimination with long-term and widespread results.103 These national 
priorities included “coverage of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
individuals under Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions, as they may 
apply.”104 
 
 96.  See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 581 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 523 
U.S. 1001 (1998) (holding that harassment against an employee because he wore an earing is unlawful 
discrimination “because of . . . sex” in violation of Title VII). 
 97.  See Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1043 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
discharging a front-desk employee for her failure to maintain a feminine appearance is unlawful 
discrimination “because of sex” in violation of Title VII).  
 98.  See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that harassment 
against an employee because he carried his serving tray “like a woman” is unlawful discrimination 
“because of sex” in violation of Title VII). 
 99.  Because the protection against sex stereotyping is afforded to everyone, courts have 
extended them to transgender people. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 
2005) (holding that the transgender plaintiff stated a Title VII claim for sex discrimination “by 
alleging discrimination . . . for his failure to conform to sex stereotypes”); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & 
Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that a transgender plaintiff stated a valid Title 
VII claim by alleging that he “did not receive [a] loan application because he was a man, whereas a 
similarly situated woman would have received [a] loan application. That is, the Bank . . . treat[s] . . . a 
woman who dresses like a man differently than a man who dresses like a woman”). 
 100.  Macy v. Holder, 2012 EEOPUB LEXIS 1181, at *19 (U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n 
Apr. 20, 2012). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN FY 2013 – 2016 
(2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/sep.pdf.  
 103.  See id. at 8. 
 104.  Id. at 10. 
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Shortly after its strategic plan went into effect, the EEOC determined that 
Title VII protects against discrimination based on transgender identity in an 
administrative appeal in Macy v. Holder, which involved a complaint of 
discrimination brought against a federal government agency.105 The complainant, 
Mia Macy, was a transgender woman.106 The EEOC does not specify in its appeal 
the meaning of transgender, but the facts of the case suggest that Macy was born 
biologically male but identified as a woman at least part of the time.107 While still 
presenting as a man to other people, Macy applied to a position with the San 
Francisco, California Walnut Creek Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives’ crime laboratory (“the laboratory”).108 She was qualified for the 
position.109 When she applied, the director of the laboratory’s operations 
informed her that she would be given the laboratory position unless her pre-
employment background check disqualified her.110 
When Macy informed the director of the laboratory that she was in the 
process of transitioning from male to female, however, the laboratory emailed 
her and told her the position was no longer available.111 Shortly afterwards, the 
laboratory hired a different candidate for the position.112 When Macy called the 
laboratory, a representative informed Macy that they had hired the other 
candidate because the agency was farthest along with his background check.113 
Macy then filed a formal complaint with the EEOC.114 Macy alleged that the 
background check explanation was pretextual and that she had been a victim of 
discrimination because of her sex.115 She described her discrimination claim as a 
“change in gender (from male to female).”116 The EEOC dismissed Macy’s 
complaint because, as the agency’s policy stood at the time, the EEOC did not 
recognize claims of discrimination based on a person’s transgender identity.117 
Macy appealed the decision and asked the EEOC to further investigate her 
claim.118 
On appeal, the EEOC determined that while a transgender person may 
establish discrimination through a variety of formulations, these formulations 
are ultimately different ways of describing the same prohibited activity: sex 
discrimination.119 And “when an employer discriminates against someone 
because the person is transgender, the employer has engaged in disparate 
 
 105.  Macy, 2012 EEOPUB LEXIS 1181. Federal employees and job applicants have a different 
complaint process and normally must contact an E.E.O. Counselor within 45 days of the alleged 
discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2012). 
 106.  Macy, 2012 EEOPUB LEXIS 1181 at *1. 
 107.  See id. at *2 (detailing that Macy transitioned from male to female). 
 108.  Id.  
 109.  Id.  
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at *4–5.  
 112.  Id. at *5. 
 113.  Id.  
 114.  Id. at *6.  
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id. at *6–7. 
 118.  Id. at *9. 
 119.  Id. at *14.  
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treatment related to the sex of the victim.”120 Thus, the EEOC concluded, 
intentional discrimination against a transgender person simply because that 
person is transgender logically is discrimination “based on . . . sex” in violation 
of Title VII.121 
The EEOC reaffirmed its interpretation of Title VII as protecting against 
discrimination based on transgender identity in a more recent administrative 
appeal, Lusardi v. McHugh.122 The complainant, Tamara Lusardi (“Lusardi”), was 
a transgender woman.123 In its appeal, the EEOC does not specify the meaning of 
transgender, but the facts of the case, as in Macy, suggest that Lusardi was born 
biologically male but identified as a woman at least part of the time.124 Lusardi 
was hired as a civilian employee with the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile 
Research Development and Engineering Center (“the Center”).125 She was hired 
when she still presented herself to others as a man, but afterwards began 
transitioning her appearance to match her female gender identity.126 She legally 
changed her name and had the Center change her name on her personnel 
records.127 Lusardi then met with her supervisors to discuss the process of her 
transitioning from presenting as a man, to living and working as a woman.128 
Lusardi and her supervisors indicated that she would use a single-user restroom 
rather than the common women’s restroom until she had undergone an 
undefined-gender-transition surgery.129 
On a few discrete occasions, Lusardi used the common women’s restroom 
because the single-user restroom was temporarily unavailable.130 Her supervisor 
confronted her during each of these incidents and told her that she had been 
observed using the common women’s restroom.131 The supervisor informed 
Lusardi that she had to use the single-user restroom until she had proof of 
having undergone the undefined “final surgery.”132 In response, Lusardi filed a 
charge against the Center.133 The Center acknowledged that Lusardi’s 
transgender identity was the sole motivation for its decision to prevent Lusardi 
from using the common women’s restroom.134 Drawing upon the reasoning 
previously espoused in Macy, the EEOC found the Center’s actions to be 
unlawful sex-based discrimination under Title VII.135 
 
 120.  Id. at *19. 
 121.  Id. at *34–35. 
 122.  Lusardi v. McHugh, 2015 EEOPUB LEXIS 896 (U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n Apr. 
1, 2015). 
 123.  Id. at *2.  
 124.  Id. at *2–3 (explaining that Lusardi transitioned from male to female).  
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Id. at *3. 
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id.  
 129.  Id. at *3–4.. 
 130.  Id. at *6.  
 131.  Id. at *6–7. 
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id. at *10. 
 134.  Id. at *18. 
 135.  Id. at *29. 
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B. The EEOC Has Taken Action to Ensure Employers’ Compliance with Its 
Interpretation of Title VII. 
Since deciding Macy and Lusardi, the EEOC has taken a variety of actions to 
ensure public and private employers’ compliance with its interpretation of Title 
VII, despite that its interpretations of Title VII are only given “respect,” not 
Chevron deference, in federal court.136 For example, the EEOC has engaged in 
public outreach and published guidance on issues affecting gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, and transgender employees.137 The EEOC also has brought several 
lawsuits on behalf of transgender employees, two of which have been 
resolved.138 These lawsuits include both sex-stereotyping claims and claims of 
sex discrimination based on transgender identity.139 The first of the resolved 
lawsuits was EEOC v. Lakeland Eye Clinic.140 The EEOC sued Lakeland Eye Clinic 
(“the Clinic”) on behalf of Brandi Branson (“Branson”), a transgender woman,141 
which, based on the allegations in the Complaint, means that Branson was born 
biologically male but identified as a woman at least part of the time.142 The EEOC 
alleged that when the Clinic first hired Branson as the Director of Hearing 
Services, she was still presenting herself as a man; Branson wore male attire and 
used the name “Michael.”143 Sometime thereafter, Branson began to change her 
appearance to match her female gender identity, including wearing women’s 
clothing and makeup.144 When the Clinic confronted Branson about her changing 
gendered appearance, Branson informed the Clinic that she would be legally 
changing her name and that she would be undergoing a gender reassignment 
surgery.145 In response, the Clinic took steps to ostracize Branson.146 The Clinic’s 
physicians no longer referred patients to her.147 The Clinic eventually terminated 
Branson.148 A representative of the Clinic explained to Branson that she was 
being terminated as the Director of Hearing because the position was being 
eliminated.149 But the Clinic soon afterwards hired a man as the Director of 
Hearing.150 The new employee conformed to traditional male gender norms.151 
 
 136.  Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
 137.  See What You Should Know About EEOC and the Enforcement Protections for LGBT Workers, 
What You Should Know, EEOC, [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Protections for LGBT Workers] 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/enforcement_protections_lgbt_workers.cfm (last 
visited April 3, 2016). In 2015, the EEOC held 700 presentations on LGBT workplace issues. Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d 594 (E.D. Mich. 2015); 
EEOC v. Lakeland Eye Clinic, P.A, No. 8:14-cv-2421 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2014). 
 140.  See Plaintiff EEOC’s Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Lakeland Eye Clinic, No. 8:14-cv-
2421 (arguing a transgender woman was fired because of her sex). 
 141.  Id. at 3. 
 142.  Id. at 3–4 (explaining that Branson was in the process of transitioning from male to female).  
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id.  
 145.  Id. at 4.  
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id.  
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id.  
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
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The EEOC alleged that the Clinic discriminated against Branson based on 
sex in violation of Title VII under three alternative legal theories: first, by firing 
her because she was transgender; second, by firing her because she was 
transitioning from male to female; and third, by firing her because she did not 
conform to the employer’s gender-based expectations (sex stereotyping claim).152 
The Clinic opted to settle with the EEOC.153 The Clinic agreed to several remedial 
actions, including paying $150,000 in settlement costs, implementing a new 
gender discrimination policy, and providing training to the Clinic’s management 
and employees about transgender/gender stereotyping discrimination.154 
The second resolved lawsuit filed by the EEOC was EEOC v. Deluxe 
Financial Services, Inc.,155 which settled in January 2016.156 The EEOC alleged that 
Deluxe Financial Services discriminated against Britney Austin (“Austin”), a 
transgender woman, based on sex in violation of Title VII.157 As explained in the 
EEOC’s Complaint, Austin presented herself to others as a man when she first 
began to work for Deluxe Financial Services.158 A few years later, Austin 
reportedly announced her intentions to transition to presenting her gender 
identity at work as a woman to match her female gender identity.159 She asked 
several times for her employment records to reflect her female name and female 
sex-designation.160 Representatives of Deluxe Financial Services, however, 
refused to change Austin’s sex-designation in its internal records until Austin 
successfully had undergone gender transition surgery and her gender 
modification was complete.161 Deluxe Financial Services also prohibited Austin 
from using the common women’s restroom.162 The EEOC further contended that 
Deluxe Financial Services had, and continued to maintain, a companywide 
policy or practice that discriminates against transgender female employees by 
precluding them from the use of a restroom that is consistent with their gender 
identity.163 
Deluxe Financial Services opted to settle with the EEOC.164 As part of its 
three year consent decree with the EEOC, the company agreed to pay Austin 
$115,000 for back pay, compensatory damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.165 
 
 152.  Id. at 5.  
 153.  Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Lakeland Eye Clinic Will Pay $150,000 to 
Resolve Transgender / Sex Discrimination Lawsuit: Clinic Agrees to Implement New Gender 
Identity Anti-Discrimination Policy (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/ 
release/4-13-15.cfm. 
 154.  Id.  
 155.  Complaint, EEOC v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 0:15-cv-02646 (D. Minn. June 4, 2015).  
 156.  Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Deluxe Financial to Settle Discrimination 
Suit on Behalf of Transgender Employee (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/ 
release/1-21-16.cfm.  
 157.  Complaint, supra note 156, at 1.  
 158.  Id. at 4.  
 159.  Id. at 5.  
 160.  Id. at 6–7.  
 161.  Id. at 6. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Deluxe Financial to Settle Discrimination Suit on Behalf of Transgender Employee, supra note 157.. 
 165.  Consent Decree at 4–5, EEOC v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 0:15-cv-02646 (D. Minn. Jan. 20, 
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Deluxe Financial Services also agreed to expunge Austin’s records and to issue 
her a formal letter of apology.166 The company also assented to changing its 2016 
health benefits plan to one that would not exclude transgender-related health 
needs,167 to revising its equal employment opportunity policies to include 
stronger language about preventing unlawful sex discrimination,168 and training 
its employees that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sex-stereotyping, 
gender-identity, and transgender status.169 Deluxe Financial Services must 
provide the EEOC with yearly reports.170 
The EEOC also has filed several other cases that have yet to be resolved.171 
EEOC v. R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.172 is one such pending case. The 
EEOC alleges that R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Home, Inc. (“the Funeral Home”), 
had employed Amiee Stephens (“Stephens”), a transgender woman, for six 
years.173 According to the Complaint, Stephens adequately performed the duties 
of her position.174 In 2013, Stephens informed the Funeral Home that she was 
undergoing a gender transition from male to female.175 The Funeral Home then 
abruptly fired Stephens.176 The Funeral Home allegedly told Stephens that “what 
she was proposing to do was unacceptable.”177 
The EEOC filed a complaint against the Funeral Home in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.178 In the Complaint, the 
agency, like in Lakeland Eye Clinic, alleged three claims: that the Funeral Home 
discriminated against Stephens because she is transgender, because of Stephens’s 
transition from male to female, and/or because Stephens did not conform to the 
defendant employer’s sex- or gender-based preferences, expectations, or 
stereotypes.179 The Funeral Home moved to dismiss the lawsuit.180 The district 
court found that while Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on 
transgender identity, the EEOC had stated a viable claim under a sex 
stereotyping theory.181 The district court thus denied the Funeral Home’s motion 
to dismiss, explaining “even though transgendered/transsexual identity is 
currently not a protected class under Title VII, Title VII nevertheless ‘protects 
transsexuals from discrimination for failing to act in accordance and/or identify 
 
2016).  
 166.  Id. at 6.  
 167.  Id. at 11.  
 168.  Id. at 8–11. 
 169.  Id. at 13–15. 
 170.  Id. at 16–18.  
 171.  See EEOC Enforcement Protections for LGBT Workers, supra note 137. 
 172.  100 F. Supp. 3d 594 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (denying employer’s motion to dismiss). 
 173.  Complaint & Jury Demand at 3, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 100 F. Supp. 3d 594 (No. 
2:14-cv-13710).  
 174.  Id.  
 175.  Id.  
 176.  Id. at 4. 
 177.  Id.  
 178.  Id. at 3. 
 179.  Id. 4–6. 
 180.  EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d 594, 595 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 181.  Id. at 599. 
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with their perceived sex or gender.’”182 A trial on the issues is expected in 2016.183 
The EEOC has not only filed lawsuits to promote its interpretation of Title 
VII as protecting against discrimination based on gender identity, but has also 
either filed or intended to file amicus briefs in several other cases involving 
transgender plaintiffs.184 For example, in Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 
the plaintiff, Jennifer Chavez (“Chavez”) worked as an auto mechanic for Credit 
Nation.185 Her work was well regarded.186 Chavez informed Credit Nation that 
she planned to transition from male to female.187 The company’s major 
stockholder, however, was uncomfortable with Chavez’s gender transition.188 A 
few months after Chavez informed Credit Nation about her transition, she dozed 
off in a car while waiting for parts to be delivered for cars she had been assigned 
to repair.189 Chavez’s supervisor took a picture of her while she was asleep in the 
car.190 Credit Nation consequently terminated her.191 
In response to her termination, Chavez attempted to file a charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC’s Atlanta District.192 The EEOC investigator 
wrongly informed Chavez, however, that she could not file a charge because 
Title VII does not protect transgender individuals against discrimination on the 
basis of sex.193 When Chavez returned to the EEOC to file a charge a second time, 
the charge was dismissed as untimely.194 Chavez then filed a lawsuit in federal 
court against Credit Nation.195 
Credit Nation moved to dismiss the complaint and argued that Chavez 
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.196 The EEOC submitted an amicus 
 
 182.  Id.. 
 183.  Marti Benedetti, Fired Detroit Funeral Home Worker May Shape Transgender Rulings, CRAIN’S 
DETROIT BUS. (Aug. 23, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20150823/NEWS/ 
308239987/fired-funeral-home-worker-may-shape-transgender-rulings. The EEOC recently accused 
the funeral home of improper discovery requests after the funeral home asked for discovery related 
to whether Stephens “had any biological children,” discovery related to whether she “has ever been 
married to a woman,” and documents related to whether Stephens “currently has male sexual 
organs.” Motion for Protective Order at 2, 3, 7, EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 100 
F. Supp. 3d 594 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 184.  See Brief of the U.S. EEOC as Amicus Curiae, Jamal v. Saks & Co., No. 4:14-cv-02782 (S.D. 
Tex. Jan. 22, 2015); Brief of EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff and in Opposition to the 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, Lewis v. Highpoint Reg'l Health Sys., 79 F. Supp. 3d 588 
(E.D.N.C. 2015) (No. 5:13-cv-838-BO); Brief of EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff, Chavez 
v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1163 (N.D. Ga. 2014) aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub 
nom. Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, No. 14-14596, 2016 WL 158820 (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2016) 
(No. 1:13-cv-00312-WSD); Brief of EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Summary Judgment, 
Pacheco v. Freedom Buick GMC Truck, Inc., No. 7:10-cv-116-RAJ (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2011). 
 185.  Brief of EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff at 3, Chavez, No. 1:13-cv-00312-WSD.. 
 186.  Id.  
 187.  Id.  
 188.  Id. at 4.  
 189.  Id.  
 190.  Id.  
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. at 5.  
 193.  Id. at 6.  
 194.  Id.  
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id.  
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brief that asserted that the EEOC investigator’s misreading of Chavez’s rights 
effectively thwarted Chavez’s efforts to exhaust her administrative remedies and 
thus she should be able to pursue her claims in federal court.197 
Recently, the EEOC motioned to intervene as a plaintiff in a lawsuit filed in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against First 
Tower Loan, LLC (“First Tower”), a Mississippi-based company.198 The EEOC 
alleges that First Tower fired Tristan Broussard (“Broussard”), a transgender 
man, after he refused to sign a written statement acknowledging that he had 
been born female but had chosen to “act and dress as a male,” and that being 
transgender was against the company’s personnel policies.199 The EEOC 
maintained that such conduct violated Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination, both because the conduct was motivated by Broussard’s 
transgender identity and because the company engaged in sex stereotyping.200 
The district court granted the EEOC’s motion to intervene.201 
V.  EFFECTS OF THE EEOC’S INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII AND DISCRIMINATION 
BASED ON TRANSGENDER IDENTITY 
Although the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII lacks the force of law and is 
not entitled to Chevron deference in court, the agency’s willingness to protect 
transgender employees against discrimination based on their non-conforming 
gender identity likely has helped to create a new, and thriving, area of 
employment discrimination law. This is evidenced by an increase in the number 
of employees who have filed charges under Title VII alleging a sex-based 
discrimination claim based on transgender or non-conforming gender identity. 
The EEOC began tracking discrimination charges that related to gender identity 
and sexual orientation in 2013.202 Between January and September of 2013, the 
EEOC received 147 charges that included allegations of sex discrimination based 
on employees’ transgender or non-conforming gender identity.203 In 2014, the 
EEOC received 202 charges that included allegations of sex discrimination based 
on transgender or nonconforming gender identity.204 In 2015, the EEOC received 
271 charges that included allegations of sex discrimination based on transgender 
or nonconforming gender identity.205 
These statistics demonstrate only that more people are filing charges, but 
the charges themselves can affect employment law and the relationships between 
employers and their employees. Employers, particularly smaller employers with 
limited financial resources, may try to voluntarily comply with the EEOC 
regulations and avoid such charges because litigation can be expensive, time 
 
 197.  Id. at 9–10. 
 198.  See Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Court Allows EEOC to Join 
Transgender / Sex Discrimination Lawsuit Against First Tower Loan (Sept. 17, 2015) 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-17-15c.cfm.  
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id.  
 201.  Id.  
 202. See EEOC Enforcement Protections for LGBT Workers, supra note 137.  
 203.  Id.  
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id.  
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consuming, and disruptive to business206 This is especially true when the 
government, via the EEOC, is the plaintiff, “because the government is a 
formidable foe if the agency decides to pursue the case— especially if the case 
turns out to be systemic.”207 It is likely that if employers understand and 
recognize that the EEOC views Title VII as prohibiting discrimination based on 
transgender identity in the workplace and that the agency is willing to litigate 
the issue, then more employers will attempt to minimize discrimination in the 
work environment. 
Indeed, there is evidence that employers are doing just that. A historically 
high number of companies are implementing human resource policies that 
protect employees on the basis of transgender identity.208 Many companies also 
have generated inclusive non-discrimination policies and/or conduct codes that 
specifically reference gender identity.209 
In addition to changing private behavior, the EEOC’s continued stance on 
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination also may affect changes to the 
federal courts’ interpretation of Title VII. In other areas of sex discrimination, the 
federal courts followed the EEOC’s interpretation of the Title VII. For instance, in 
1965, the EEOC issued its Guidelines on Sex Discrimination.210 As explained in 
these guidelines, the EEOC interpreted VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination as 
also prohibiting employers from refusing to hire or promote women because 
they were married or had children, unless the employers similarly treated male 
job applicants and employees.211 The Supreme Court affirmed the EEOC’s 
interpretation of Title VII six years later, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.212 In 
this case, Marin Marietta Corporation informed the plaintiff, a mother, that it 
would not hire her because she had young children.213 At the time of refusing the 
plaintiff’s application, the company employed fathers of young children.214 
Affirming the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII in the Guidelines, the Court 
explained that having different employment standards for mothers and fathers 
was unlawful sex discrimination.215 
Similarly, when the EEOC revised its Guidelines on Sex Discrimination in 
1968, it determined that Title VII prohibits state laws designed to protect only 
female employees.216 These state laws required employers to provide women 
 
 206.  See Charles G. Meyer III, The Case for Employment Practice Liability Insurance, 38 EMP. REL. L.J. 
54, 55 (2012) (explaining the problems that charges pose for businesses).  
 207.  Abigail Rubenstein, 5 Tips For Employers Facing An EEOC Investigation, LAW 360 (Jan. 30, 
2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/505121/5-tips-for-employers-facing-an-eeoc-investigation. 
 208.  See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2016: RATING 
AMERICAN WORKPLACES ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 18 (2015), 
http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/CEI-2016-
FullReport.pdf (reporting on the growth of transgender-friendly workplace policies). 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  THE STORY OF THE UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra 
note 39, at 7.  
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). 
 213.  Id. at 543.  
 214.  Id.  
 215.  Id. at 544.  
 216.  THE STORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 7.  
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with special benefits, such as shorter work hours and early retirement.217 These 
state laws also effectively prevented women from being hired for many blue-
collar jobs.218 In 1969, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
adopted the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting state laws requiring 
employers to provide women with special benefits in Weeks v. Southern Bell 
Telephone & Telegraph Co.219 In 1971, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit followed suit in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.220 As they did with 
varying standards for mothers and fathers, and for state laws protecting female 
employees, the federal courts could follow the EEOC’s lead and find that 
discrimination based on transgender identity is unlawful discrimination based 
on sex. 
Some federal courts have already indicated willingness to adopt the EEOC’s 
arguments that Title VII protects against discrimination based on transgender 
identity.221 These courts rest the possibility of such an adoption on future 
understandings of biological sex.222 For example, the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia noted that it “may be time” to revisit Title VII’s 
relationship with transgender identity because of the “factual complexities that 
underlie human sexual identity.”223 According to the district court, these 
complexities “stem from real variations in how the different components of 
biological sexuality . . . interact with each other, and in turn, with social, 
psychological, and legal conceptions of gender.”224 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit likewise has stated that if sexual identity were 
found to be biological, it would be required to reevaluate Title VII’s prohibition 
of discrimination against transgender people based on transgender identity.225 
While not particularly legally consequential, the EEOC’s interpretation of Title 
VII may provide the impetus for changes within the federal courts about 
understandings of gender and sex. As the EEOC’s arguments about gender and 
sex become more sophisticated, the opportunities for change within the court 
system will expand and will make Title VII’s revision all the more likely. 
CONCLUSION 
The EEOC’s focus on remedying discrimination against transgender 
employees in the workplace using Title VII may not have the force of law or the 
 
 217.  Id. at 8.  
 218.  Id.  
 219.  The Fifth Circuit held that an employer could not rely on a Georgia law limiting women to 
jobs requiring lifting 25 to 30 pounds because the law violated Title VII. Weeks v. S. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
408 F.2d 228, 233–34 (5th Cir. 1969).  
 220.  The Ninth Circuit held that an employer could not rely on California labor laws limiting 
hours and weightlifting for female employees as a defense to a complaint of discrimination. 
Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1266 (9th Cir. 1971).  
 221.  See Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1995); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 
203, 212 (D.D.C. 2006).  
 222.  See Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212-13; Brown, 63 F.2d at 971. 
 223.  Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212.  
 224.  Id.  
 225.  Brown, 63 F.3d at 971. See also Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 
2007) (explaining that “scientific research may someday cause a shift in the plain meaning of the term 
‘sex’ so that it extends beyond the two starkly defined categories of male and female”).  
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backing of the federal courts. The agency, however, does have the ability to 
influence employment law, and there is some evidence that employers may be 
responding to the EEOC’s adoption of its Strategic Enforcement Plan. Moreover, 
some federal courts have indicated some willingness to recognize that Title VII 
protects against discrimination based on transgender identity alone. Whether the 
EEOC is able to push the courts towards this direction and, perhaps more 
importantly, whether this change is long lasting, is yet to be seen. 
 
